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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Mr. Lundahl timely appeals from the district court's order relinquishing jurisdiction 
and its order denying his I.C.R. 35 motion requesting leniency. On appeal, Mr. Lundahl 
argues that the Idaho Supreme Court denied him due process and equal protection 
when it refused to augment the record with various transcripts Mr. Lundahl requested to 
be created at the public's expense. Mr. Lundahl also argues that the district court 
abused its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction and denied his I.C.R. 35 motion. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Lundahl was charged, by Information, with driving under the influence of 
alcohol (hereinafter "DUI") and a felony enhancement. (R., pp.46-47.) Pursuant to a 
plea agreement, Mr. Lundahl pleaded guilty to the DUI and the felony enhancement. 
(R., pp.48-56, 63.) Thereafter, the district court imposed a unified sentence of seven 
years, with two years fixed, but suspended that sentence and placed Mr. Lundahl on 
probation. (R., pp.63-67.) 
After a period of probation, the State filed a motion for a bench warrant on a 
probation violation, alleging that Mr. Lundahl violated various terms of his probation. 
(R., pp.71-73.) Mr. Lundahl admitted to violating the terms of his probation by driving 
without a license and consuming alcohol. (R., pp.72, 87.) The district court then 
revoked Mr. Lundahl's probation, but retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.91-93.) Upon review 
of Mr. Lundahl's period of retained jurisdiction (hereinafter, "rider"), the district court 
relinquished jurisdiction. (R., pp.97-98.) 
1 
Mr. Lundahl then filed an I.C.R. 35 motion requesting leniency, which was denied 
by the district court. (R., pp.100-101, 114-116.) 
Mr. Lundahl then filed a motion requesting credit for time served, which was 
granted by the district court. 1 (R., pp.119-125.) 
On appeal, Mr. Lundahl's appellate counsel filed a motion to augment the record 
with various transcripts and to suspend the briefing schedule pending the preparation of 
those transcripts. (Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule and 
Statement in Support Thereof (hereinafter, Motion to Augment), pp.1-5.) The State 
objected to Mr. Lundahl's request for the transcripts. (Objection to "Motion to Augment 
and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule and Statement in Support Thereof" (hereinafter, 
Objection to Motion to Augment), pp.1-4.) Thereafter, the Idaho Supreme Court entered 
an order denying Mr. Lundahl's request for a transcript of the probation violation 
hearing, held on July 13, 2010, and the probation disposition hearing, held on 
August 31, 2010. (Order Denying Motion to Augment and Suspend the Briefing 
Schedule (hereinafter, Order Denying Motion to Augment), p.1.) 
1 Mr. Lundahl is not raising this as an issue on appeal. 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Mr. Lundahl due process and equal 
protection when it denied his Motion to Augment with the requested transcripts? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction? 
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Lundahl's I.C.R. 35 
motion requesting leniency? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Lundahl Due Process And Equal Protection 
When It Denied His Motion To Augment The Appellate Record With Necessary 
Transcripts 
A. Introduction 
A long line of United States Supreme Court cases hold that it is a violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal protection clauses to deny an indigent 
defendant access to transcripts of proceedings which are relevant to issues the 
defendant intends to raise on appeal. In the event the record reflects a colorable need 
for a transcript, the only way a court can constitutionally preclude an indigent defendant 
from obtaining that transcript is if the State can prove that the transcript is irrelevant to 
the issues raised on appeal. 
In this case, Mr. Lundahl filed a Motion to Augment requesting a transcript of the 
probation violation hearing, held on July 13, 2010, and the probation disposition 
hearing, held on August 31, 2010, wherein he argued that, when determining whether to 
relinquish jurisdiction, a district court can consider all of the prior hearings. That motion 
was denied by the Supreme Court. On appeal, Mr. Lundahl is challenging the Idaho 
Supreme Court's denial of his request for transcripts of the probation violation hearing, 
held on July 13, 2010, and the probation disposition hearing, held on August 31, 2010. 
Mr. Lundahl asserts that the requested transcripts are relevant to the issue of whether 
the district court abused its discretion in relinquishing jurisdiction because the district 
court could rely on its memory of the probation revocation hearings when it decided to 
relinquish jurisdiction. Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court erred in denying his 
request. 
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B. The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Lundahl Due Process And Equal 
Protection When It Denied His Motion To Augment The Appellate Record With 
The Necessary Transcripts 
1. The Idaho Supreme Court, By Failing To Provide Mr. Lundahl With Access 
To The Requested Transcripts, Has Denied Him Due Process Because 
He Cannot Obtain A Merit Based Appellate Review Of His Sentencing 
Claims 
The constitutions of both the United States and the state of Idaho guarantee a 
criminal defendant due process of law. See U.S. CaNST. amend. XIV; IDAHO. CaNST. 
art.I§13. 
It is firmly established that due process requires notice and a meaningful 
opportunity to be heard. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965); 
Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948). The Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment also protects against arbitrary and capricious acts 
of the government. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). Due 
process requires that judicial proceedings be "fundamentally fair." 
Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Servo of Durham Cly., 452 U.S. 18, 24 
(1981). 
State V. Card, 121 Idaho 425,445 (1991) (overruled on other grounds by State V. Wood, 
132 Idaho 88 (1998)). Additionally, the Idaho Supreme Court has "applied the United 
States Supreme Court's standard for interpreting the due process clause of the United 
States Constitution to art. I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution." Maresh V. State, 
Dept. of Health and Welfare ex reI. Caballero, 132 Idaho 221, 227 (1998). 
In Idaho, a criminal defendant's right to appeal is created by statute. See 
I.C. § 19-2801. Idaho statutes dictate that if an indigent defendant requests a transcript, 
the cost of such transcript must be created at county expense. I.C. § 1-1105(2); 
I.C. § 19-863(a). Idaho court rules also address this issue. Idaho Criminal Rule 5.2 
mandates the production of transcripts when requested by an indigent defendant. 
I.CR. 5.2(a). Further, "[t]ranscripts may be requested of any hearing or proceeding 
before the court .... " Id. Idaho Criminal Rule 54.7 further enables a district court to 
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"order a transcript to be prepared at county expense if the appellant is exempt from 
paying such a fee as provided by statute or law." !,C.R.54.7(a). 
An appeal from an order relinquishing jurisdiction is an appeal of right as defined 
in Idaho Appellate Rule 11. "Relief from ... [an order relinquishing jurisdiction] may 
appropriately be sought through a direct appeal." State v. Urias, 123 Idaho 751, 754 n.1 
(Ct. App. 1993). 
The United States Supreme Court has issued a long line of cases that directly 
address whether indigent defendants, who have a statutory right to an appeal, can 
require the state to pay for an appellate record including verbatim transcripts of the 
relevant trial proceedings. There are two fundamental themes which permeate these 
cases. The first theme is that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal 
protection clauses are interpreted broadly. Any disparate treatment between indigent 
defendants and those with financial means is not tolerated. However, the second 
theme limits a state's obligation to provide indigent defendants with a record for review. 
The states do not have to provide indigent defendants with everything they request. In 
order to meet the constitutional mandates of due process and equal protection, the 
states must provide indigent defendants with an appellate record unless some or all of 
the requested materials are unnecessary or frivolous. 
The seminal opinion in this line of cases is Griffin v. Illinois 351 U.S. 12 (1956). 
In that case, two indigent defendants "filed a motion in the trial court asking that a 
certified copy of the entire record, including a stenographic transcript of the 
proceedings, be furnished them without cost." Griffin, 351 at 13. At that time, the State 
of Illinois provided free transcripts for indigent defendants that had been sentenced to 
death, but required defendants in all other criminal cases to purchase transcripts 
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themselves. Id. at 14. The sole question before the United States Supreme Court was 
whether the denial of the requested transcripts to indigent non-death penalty defendants 
was a denial of due process or equal protection. Id. at 16. 
The Supreme Court initially noted that "[p]roviding equal justice for poor and rich, 
weak and powerful alike is an age old problem." Id. "Both equal protection and due 
process emphasize the central aim of our entire judicial system-all people charged with 
crime must, so far as the law is concerned, 'stand on an equality before the bar of 
justice in every American court.'" Id. at 17 (quoting Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 
241 (1940)). "In criminal trials a State can no more discriminate on account of poverty 
than on account of religion, race, or color." Id. The Supreme Court went on to hold as 
follows: 
There is no meaningful distinction between a rule which would deny the 
poor the right to defend themselves in a trial court and one which 
effectively denies the poor an adequate appellate review accorded to all 
who have money enough to pay the costs in advance. It is true that a 
State is not required by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate 
courts or a right to appellate review at all. But that is not to say that a 
State that does grant appellate review can do so in a way that 
discriminates against some convicted defendants on account of their 
poverty. Appellate review has now become an integral part of the Illinois 
trial system for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant. 
Consequently at all stages of the proceedings the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses protect persons like petitioners from invidious 
discriminations. 
Id. at 18 (citations and footnotes omitted). In order to satisfy the constitutional 
mandates of both due process and equal protection, an indigent defendant must be 
provided with a record which facilitates an effective merits-related appellate review. At 
the same time, the Supreme Court noted that a stenographic transcript is not necessary 
in instances where a less expensive, yet adequate, alternative exists. Id. at 20. 
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In Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959), the Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding 
in Griffin when it struck down a requirement that all appeals to the Ohio Supreme Court 
be accompanied with a requisite filing fee, regardless of a defendant's indigency. In 
that case, the State argued that the defendant had already received appellate review of 
his conviction by the Ohio appellate court. Burns, 360 U.S. at 257. The United States 
Supreme Court rejected this argument and ruled that "once the State chooses to 
establish appellate review in criminal cases, it may not foreclose indigents from access 
to any phase of that procedure because of their poverty." Id. 'This principle is no less 
applicable where the State has afforded an indigent defendant access to the first phase 
of its appellate procedure but has effectively foreclosed access to the second phase of 
that procedure solely because of his indigency." Id. 
In State v. Draper, 372 U.S. 487 (1963), the Supreme Court addressed a 
procedure determining access to transcripts based on a frivolousness standard. "Under 
the present standard, ... , they must convince the trial judge that their contentions of 
error have merit before they can obtain the free transcript necessary to prosecute their 
appeaL" Draper, 372 U.S. 494. The Supreme Court first expanded upon its statement 
in Griffin, that a stenographic transcript is not required if an equivalent alternative is 
available, by adding a relevancy requirement when stating that "part or all of the 
stenographic transcript in certain cases will not be germane to consideration of the 
appeal, and a State will not be required to expend its funds unnecessarily in such 
circumstances." Id. at 495. The Court went on to discuss the specific issues raised for 
appeal by the defendants to decide the relevance of the requested transcripts. The 
Court ultimately concluded that the issues raised by the defendants could not be 
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adequately reviewed without resorting to the stenographic transcripts of the trial 
proceedings. Id. at 497-99. 
Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971), extended the Griffin protections 
to defendants convicted of non-felony offenses, and placed the burden on the State to 
prove that the requests for verbatim transcripts are not relevant to the issues raised on 
appeal. In doing so, it was held that a defendant need only make a colorable argument 
that he/she needs items to create a complete record on appeal. Id. at 195. If the State 
wants to deny the defendant's request, it is the State's burden to prove that the 
requested items are not necessary for the appeal. Id. 
This authority has been recognized by both the Idaho Supreme Court and the 
Idaho Court of Appeals. See Gardener v. State, 91 Idaho 909 (1967); State v. 
Callaghan, 143 Idaho 856 (Ct. App. 2006); State v. Braaten, 144 Idaho 60 (Ct. App. 
2007). 
An application of the foregoing rules to the facts of this case creates a situation 
analogous to Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1863). In that case, a transcript was 
necessary to perfect an appeal and the appeal could be dismissed without the 
transcript. Lane, 327 U.S. at 478-81. Similarly, in Idaho, an appellant must provide an 
adequate record or face procedural default. "It is well established that an appellant 
bears the burden to provide an adequate record upon which the appellate court can 
review the merits of the claims of error, ... and where pertinent portions of the record 
are missing on appeal, they are presumed to support the actions of the trial court." 
State v. Coma, 133 Idaho 29, 34 (Ct. App. 1999) (citing State v. Beck, 128 Idaho 416, 
422 (Ct. App. 1996); State v. Beason, 119 Idaho 103, 105 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. 
Murinko, 108 Idaho 872, 873 (Ct. App. 1985); State v. Repici, 122 Idaho 538, 541 
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(Ct. App. 1992)). If the transcripts are missing, but the record contains court minutes, 
that may be sufficient so that a "meaningful review of [an appellant's] claim is possible, 
although the Idaho Court of Appeals has "strongly suggest[ed] that appellate counsel 
not rely on the district court minutes to provide an adequate record for [that] Court's 
review." State v. Murphy, 133 Idaho 489, 491 (Ct. App. 1999). If Mr. Lundahl fails to 
provide the appellate court with the requested items, the legal presumption will apply 
and Mr. Lundahl's claims will not be addressed on their actual merits. If it is state action 
alone, which prevents him from access to the requested items, then such action is a 
violation of due process, as per Lane, and any such presumption should no longer 
apply. 
Whether the transcripts of the requested proceedings were before the district 
court at the time of the probation revocation hearing is not relevant in deciding whether 
the transcript is relevant to the issues on appeal because in reaching a sentencing 
decision, a district court is not limited to considering only that information offered at the 
hearing from which the appeal is filed. Rather, a court is entitled to utilize knowledge 
gained from its own official position and observations. Downing v. State, 136 Idaho 
367, 373-74 (Ct. App. 2001); see also State v. Sivak, 105 Idaho 900, 907 (1983) 
(recognizing that the findings of the trial judge in sentencing are based, in part, upon 
what the court heard during the trial); State v. Wa/lace, 98 Idaho 318 (1977) 
(recognizing that the court could rely upon "the number of certain types of criminal 
transactions that [the judge] has observed in the courts within his judicial district and the 
quantity of drugs therein involved"); State v. Gibson, 106 Idaho 491 (Ct. App. 1984) 
(approving sentencing court's reliance upon evidence presented at the preliminary 
hearing from a previously dismissed case because "the judge hardly could be expected 
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to disregard what he already knew about Gibson from the other case"). Thus, whether 
the prior hearings were transcribed or not is irrelevant, because the court may rely upon 
the information it already knows from presiding over the prior hearings when it made the 
decision to relinquish jurisdiction. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals has recently issued an opinion in State v. Morgan, 
Docket No 39057, 2012 Opinion No 38 (Ct. App. 2012) (not yet final), which addressed 
the foregoing argument. In that case, the defendant pleaded guilty and was placed on 
probation. Id. at 1. After a period of probation, the defendant admitted to violating the 
terms of his probation and the district court revoked probation but retained jurisdiction. 
Id. at 1-2. After completing the rider, the district court placed the defendant on 
probation. Id. at 2. The defendant admitted to violating the terms of his probation and 
the district court revoked probation. Id. The defendant appealed from the district 
court's second order revoking probation. Id. 
On appeal, the defendant filed a motion to augment the appellate record with 
transcripts associated with his first probation violation and disposition, which was denied 
by the Idaho Supreme Court. Id. The defendant then raised as issues on appeal the 
question of whether the Idaho Supreme Court denied him due process and equal 
protection when it denied the motion to augment and the issue of whether the district 
court abused its discretion when it revoked probation. Id. at 2-3. The Idaho Court of 
Appeals held that the transcripts of the prior probation proceedings were not necessary 
for the appeal because "they were not before the district court in the second probation 
violation proceedings, and the district court gave no indication that it based its 
revocation decision upon anything that occurred during those proceedings." Id. at 4. 
While Morgan does directly deal with the issues raised in this appeal, at this point 
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this case is not final. Moreover, it is distinguishable because Mr. Lundahl is challenging 
not only the order relinquishing jurisdiction, but also the denial of his I.C.R. 35 motion, 
which entails an analysis of the district court's sentencing rationale. 
Additionally, the requested items are within an Idaho appellate court's scope of 
review, The transcripts of the probation violation hearing, held on July 13, 2010, and 
the probation disposition hearing, held on August 31,2010, are relevant because Idaho 
appellate courts review all proceedings following sentencing when determining whether 
the court made appropriate sentencing determinations. See State v. Hanington, 148 
Idaho 26, 28 (Ct. App. 2009) ("When we review a sentence that is ordered into 
execution following a period of probation, we will examine the entire record 
encompassing events before and after the original judgment. We base our review upon 
the facts existing when the sentence was imposed as well as events occurring between 
the original sentencing and the revocation of probation." (emphasis added)).2 The 
scope of review in this matter is broadened because, and as stated above, Mr. Lundahl 
is also challenging the district court's denial of his I.C.R. 35 motion. See State v. 
Arazia, 109 Idaho 188, 189 (Ct. App. 1985) ("Where an appeal is taken from an order 
2 In Morgan, supra, the Court of Appeals clarified the scope of review articulated in 
Hanington. Specifically it held: 
In reviewing the propriety of a probation revocation, we will not arbitrarily 
confine ourselves to only those facts which arise after sentencing to the 
time of the revocation of probation. However, that does not mean that al! 
proceedings in the trial court up to and including sentencing are germane. 
The focus of the inquiry is the conduct underlying the trial court's decision 
to revoke probation. Thus, this Court will consider the elements of the 
record before the trial court relevant to the revocation of probation issues 
which are properly made part of the record on appeal. 
Morgan, at 4 (original emphasis). As stated above, Morgan opinion is not a final opinion 
and Mr. Lundahl is raising a sentencing claim in this appeal. 
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refusing to reduce a sentence under Rule 35 [the appellate court's] scope of review 
includes all information submitted at the original sentencing hearing and at the 
subsequent hearing held on the motion to reduce."). 
Further support for Mr. Lundahl's position can be found in State v. Warren, 123 
Idaho 20 (Ct. App.1992). In that case, Mr. Warren was convicted of aggravated battery 
in 1988 and placed on probation. Id. at 21. Mr. Warren's probation was then revoked 
and the district court retained jurisdiction for 180 days. Id. After completing the period 
of retained jurisdiction, Mr. Warren was placed on another period of probation, which 
was ultimately revoked. Id. The district court then sua sponte reduced the length of 
Mr. Warren's sentence. Id. Mr. Warren then appealed and alleged that the district court 
should have further reduced the length of his sentence. Id. In support of that position, 
Mr. Warren argued that his probation violation was trivial. Id. The Court of Appeals 
addressed that argument stating "Warren incorrectly points to the nature of the 
probation violation by arguing that his violation was trivial. This Court must look at the 
nature of the original criminal offense, in this case aggravated battery where Warren bit 
off his victim's ear." Id. However, the Court of Appeals did not address the merits of his 
sentence reduction claim because he failed to provide a transcript of the original PSI 
and a transcript of the original sentencing hearing. Id. Even though the original 
sentence was not on appeal, and happened years before the decision at issue, the 
Idaho Court of Appeals held that the transcript was necessary to address Mr. Warren's 
claims of error. Moreover, there was no indication that a transcript of that hearing was 
created before the probation violation hearing or that the district court referenced the 
original sentencing hearing at the probation violation disposition hearing. It appears that 
the Court of Appeals assumed that the original sentencing hearing would address the 
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nature of the original offense. Had Mr. Lundahl failed to request the transcripts at issue, 
the Warren opinion indicates that it would be presumed to support the district court's 
decision to execute the original sentence. 
In sum, there is a long line of cases which repeatedly hold it is a violation of both 
due process and equal protection to deny indigent defendants transcripts of trial 
proceedings on appeal. The decision to deny Mr. Lundahl's request for the probation 
violation hearing, held on July 13, 2010, and the probation disposition hearing, held on 
August 31, 2010, will render his appeal meaningless because it will be presumed that 
the missing transcripts support the district court's sentencing decisions. This functions 
as a procedural bar to the review of Mr. Lundahl's appellate sentencing claims on the 
merits, and therefore, Mr. Lundahl should either be provided with the requested 
transcripts or the presumption should not be applied. 
2. The Idaho Supreme Court, By Failing To Provide Mr. Lundahl With 
Access To The Requested Transcripts Has Denied Him Due Process 
Because He Cannot Obtain Effective Assistance Of Counsel On Appeal 
In Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), the Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
in the context of death penalty cases was selectively incorporated to the states through 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution. In coming to this conclusion, the United State Supreme Court reasoned 
that the ability to be heard by counsel is so inextricable related to due process that the 
denial of counsel is tantamount to the denial of a hearing. Powell, 287 U.S. at 69. The 
Supreme Court also stated that under the facts of Powell: 
the necessity of counsel was so vital and imperative that the failure to 
make an effective appointment of counsel was likewise a denial of due 
process within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment ... [to] hold 
otherwise would be to ignore the fundamental postulate, already adverted 
to, "that there are certain immutable principles of justice which inhere in 
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the very idea of free government which no member of the Union may 
disregard," 
Id, at 71-72. 
In Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), the United States Supreme Court 
relied on Griffin, supra, and is progeny and determined that the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the states to provide indigent defendants the 
right to counsel on appeal. In Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985), the protection of 
Doug/as was extended to the right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal. 
According to the United States Supreme Court: 
In short, the promise of Douglas that a criminal defendant has a right to 
counsel on appeal-like the promise of Gideon that a criminal defendant 
has a right to counsel at trial would be a futile gesture unless it 
comprehended the right to effective assistance of counsel. 
Evitts, 469 U,S. at 397. 
The remaining issue is defining effective assistance of counsel. According to the 
United States Supreme Court, appellate counsel must make a conscientious 
examination of the case and file a brief in support of the best arguments to be made. 
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967), held that the constitutional requirements 
of substantial equality and fair process "can only be attained where counsel acts as an 
active advocate on behalf of his client .... [Counsel's] role as advocate requires that he 
support his client's interest's to the best of his ability." See also Banuelos v. State, 127 
Idaho 860, 865 (Ct. App. 1995). In this case, the lack of access to the requested 
transcripts prevented appellate counsel from making a conscientious examination of the 
case and has potentially prevented appellate counsel from determining whether there is 
an additional issue to raise, or whether there is a factual support either in favor of any 
argument made or undercutting an argument. Therefore, Mr. Lundahl has not obtained 
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review of the court proceedings based on the merits and was not provided with effective 
assistance of counsel in that endeavor. 
Furthermore, in State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137 (1989) (overruled on 
other grounds by State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425 (1991)), the Idaho Supreme Court held 
that the starting point for evaluating whether counsel renders effective assistance of 
counsel in a criminal action is the AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS FOR 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE DEFENSE FUNCTION. These standards offer insight into 
the role and responsibilities of appellate counsel. Regarding appellate counsel, the 
standards state: 
Appellate counsel should give a client his or her best professional 
evaluation of the questions that might be presented on appeal. Counsel, 
when inquiring into the case, should consider all issues that might affect 
the validity of the judgment of conviction and sentence. . .. Counsel 
should advise on the probable outcome of a challenge to the conviction or 
sentence. Counsel should endeavor to persuade the client to abandon a 
wholly frivolous appeal or to eliminate contentions lacking in substance. 
Standard 4-8.3(b). In the absence of access to the requested transcripts, appellate 
counsel can neither make a professional evaluation of the questions that might be 
presented on appeal, nor consider all issues that might have affected the district court's 
decision to relinquish jurisdiction. Further, counsel is unable to advise Mr. Lundahl on 
the probable role the transcripts may play in the appeal. 
Mr. Lundahl is entitled to effective assistance of counsel in this appeal, and 
effective assistance cannot be given in the absence of access to all of the relevant 
transcripts. Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court has denied Mr. Lundahl his 
constitutional right to due process which includes a right to the effective assistance of 
counsel in this appeal. Accordingly, appellate counsel should be provided with access 
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to the requested transcripts and should be allowed the opportunity to provide any 
necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which arise as a result of that review. 
II. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Relinquished Jurisdiction 
Mr. Lundahl argues that under any view of the facts, the district court abused its 
discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction. The decision to relinquish jurisdiction lies 
within the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Rhoades, 122 Idaho 837, 837 (Ct. 
App. 1992). 
When an exercise of discretion is reviewed on appeal, the 
appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry. The sequence of the 
inquiry is: (1) whether the lower court rightly perceived the issue as one 
of discretion; (2) whether the court acted within the outer boundaries of 
such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to 
specific choices; and (3) whether the court reached its decision by an 
exercise of reason. 
State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989). Mr. Lundahl does not contest whether the 
district court appropriately perceived its ability to relinquish jurisdiction as one of 
discretion. Mr. Lundahl argues that the district court did not exercise that discretion 
based on the appropriate legal standards and that the district court failed to exercise 
reason when relinquishing jurisdiction. 
As a preliminary note, Mr. Lundahl incorporates the mitigating information 
contained in Section III, infra, herein by this reference. 
Mr. Lundahl's rider performance was not that bad despite the fact that the 
Addendum to Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, APSI) recommended the 
district court to relinquish jurisdiction. According to Mr. Lundahl, he was surprised he 
was considered aggressive. (Tr., p.50, Ls.19-22. p.52, Ls.8-11.) Mr. Lindahl's 
perceived aggressiveness might have been attributable to the changes the State made 
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to his medications while on his rider. (Tr., p.51, Ls.17-23.) Mr. Lundahl also had 
problems which were caused by Idaho Department of Corrections (hereinafter, IDOC) 
staff changes, which prevented him from developing a trusting relationship with his 
treatment providers. (Tr., p.50, L.22 - p.52, L.7.) Despite these setbacks, Mr. Lundahl 
was considered a "serious student" in his creative writing course and "always gave 
100%." (Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.117.) In fact, 
Mr. Lundahl thought he was being respectful to staff and he completed a lot of the 
programming. (Tr., p.52, Ls.11-17; PSI, p.111.) 
In sum, Mr. Lundahl's negative rider performance was partially attributable to 
factors outside his control. However, he did succeed in some of his programming. 
III. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Lundahl's I.C.R. 35 Motion 
Requesting Leniency In light Of The IDOC's Inability To Coordinate His Mental Health 
Treatment With His Programming 
Mr. Lundahl argues that the unified sentence of seven years, with two years 
fixed, is unduly harsh when it is viewed in light of the mitigating factors present in this 
matter. A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence under I.C.R. 35 is addressed to 
the sound discretion of the sentencing court, and essentially is a plea for leniency which 
may be granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe. State v. Trent, 
125 Idaho 251, 253 (Ct. App. 1994) (citing State v. Forde, 113 Idaho 21 (Ct. App. 
1987)). "The criteria for examining rulings denying the requested leniency are the same 
as those applied in determining whether the original sentence was reasonable." Id. 
Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively 
harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record 
giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the 
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protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, "'[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, 
an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the 
court imposing the sentence.'" State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (quoting 
State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Mr. Lundahl does not allege that his 
sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of 
discretion, Mr. Lundahl must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence 
was excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. The governing criteria or 
objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the 
individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) 
punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id. 
"Where an appeal is taken from an order refusing to reduce a sentence under 
Rule 35, [the appellate court's] scope of review includes all information submitted at the 
original sentencing hearing and at the subsequent hearing held on the motion to 
reduce." State v. Arazia, 109 Idaho 188, 189 (Ct. App. 1985). "If the sentence was not 
excessive when pronounced, the defendant must later show that it is excessive in view 
of new or additional information presented with the motion for reduction." State v. 
Knighton, 143 Idaho 318, 320 (2006). 
As a preliminary note, Mr. Lundahl incorporates the mitigating information 
contained in Section II of this brief herein by this reference. 
Mr. Lundahl provided new information in support of his I.C.R. 35 motion. 
Mr. Lundahl filed a supplement to his I.C.R. 35 motion, which indicated that a treatment 
provider concluded that he needed to be stabilized on medications for three months 
before beginning his programming. (R., p.106.) Mr. Lundahl also indicated that he was 
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not mentally stable when he began the programming. (R., p.106.) Mr. Lundahl 
provided additional information detailing the various medications he was exposed to 
while on his rider, and how they made him frustrated and agitated. (R., p.i07.) 
However, Mr. Lundahl was eventually stabilized and, from that point on, he performed 
well on his rider. (R., pp.1 07-1 OB.) Therefore, IDOC's failure to adequately stabilize 
Mr. Lundahl should not have been used against him. 
Additionally, there were mitigating factors before the district court at the time of 
sentencing which, when viewed in light of the new information, provide further support 
for the conclusion that Mr. Lundahl's sentence is excessive. Specifically, Mr. Lundahl's 
educational background is a mitigating factor. Prior to sentencing, Mr. Lundahl was 
planning to enroll for his junior year of college at Boise State University. (Tr., p.15, L.23 
- p.16, L.7; PSI, p.B.) "He was in a program to become a physician's assistant." (Tr., 
pA9, Ls.7-B.) According to trial counsel, "[t]he best thing for him is to be back in school, 
not prison." (Tr., p.26, Ls.11-12.) One of his professors stated that Mr. Lundahl "is very 
bright and capable of succeeding." (PSI, p.34.) 3 
Additionally, Mr. Lundahl's abuse as a child is a mitigating factor. Mr. Lundahl's 
parents fought often when he was growing up. (PSI, pp.6-7.) Mr. Lundahl was also a 
direct victim of this environment. (PSI, pp.6-7.) According to the presentence 
investigator, "[c]learly, the defendant was raised in a home riddled with abuse." (PSI, 
p.13.) At the age of five, Mr. Lundahl had to call 911 to report that his father was 
abusing his mother with a weight-lifting belt. (pSI, p.3B.) At the Age of 11, Mr. Lundahl 
had to use golf clubs to stop his father from strangling his mother. (PSI, p.39.) When 
3 The citations to the PSI and the attached exhibits adhere to the pagination of the 
electronic PDF file. 
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Mr. Lundahl was sixteen, his father pinned him to the ground and punched him in the 
head approximately fifteen times. (PSI, p.43.) 
Additionally, Mr. Lundahl's mental health issues are mitigating factors. 
Mr. Lundahl suffers from PTSD and ADHD. (PSI, p.10.) Mr. Lundahl's PTSD was 
caused by his childhood relationship with his father. (PSI, pp.13, 35.) Mr. Lundahl uses 
alcohol as a means to relieve the symptoms of his PTSD. (PSI, p.46.) 
Further, Mr. Lundahl's remorse is a mitigating factor. Mr. Lundahl expressed 
remorse for his behavior. (PSI, p.2.) He also attended a victim's panel and realized 
how serious his actions were and how grateful he was that no one was injured. (PSI, 
p.2.) 
Finally, the fact that this is Mr. Lundahl's first felony conviction is also a mitigating 
factor. (PSI, p.13.) 
In sum, it was recommended that Mr. Lundahl be stabilized on his medications 
before beginning his rider. However, this did not occur and he was exposed to a myriad 
of medications before he was stabilized. It was during that period of time that he had 
problems on his rider. After he was stabilized he performed well. When this is taken 
into consideration along with the other mitigating factors present in this matter, it 
supports the conclusion that Mr. Lundahl's sentence is excessively harsh. 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellate counsel respectfully requests access to the requested transcripts and 
the opportunity to provide any necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which 
arise as a result of that review. In the event this request is denied, Mr. Lundahl 
respectfully requests that this Court remand this matter with instructions for the district 
court to place him on probation. Alternatively, Mr. Lundahl respectfully requests that 
this Court reduce the indeterminate portion of his sentence. 
DATED this 8th day of August, 2012. 
SHAWN F. WILKERSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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